Saturday, February 07, 2009

Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom II

The Last Judgement (c. 1467-1471)
(Image from Wikipedia)

Two blog entries ago, I posted on "Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom" in response to a couple of comments by Professor David C. Innis on an even earlier entry in which I ask about "Total Depravity?"

In my blog entry on "Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom," I cited Matthew 11:23 as a scriptural foundation for free will:
καὶ σύ Καφαρναούμ μὴ ἕως οὐρανοῦ ὑψωθήσῃ ἕως ᾅδου καταβήσῃ ὅτι εἰ ἐν Σοδόμοις ἐγενήθησαν αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ γενόμεναι ἐν σοί ἔμεινεν ἂν μέχρι τῆς σήμερον (Morphological Greek New Testament)

And thou, Capernaum, which unto the heaven wast exalted, unto hades shalt be brought down, because if in Sodom had been done the mighty works that were done in thee, it had remained unto this day; (Young's Literal Translation)
My argument was as follows:
Look at the biblical statement, which -- in its larger textual context -- effectively means that Capernaum will be condemned because Sodom would have repented (cf. verse 20). The "because" here specifies the reason for Capernaum's condemnation, namely, that Sodom would have repented, implying that Capernaum should also have repented. But that implication further entails that Capernaum could have repented, for a "should" entails a "could."
Professor Innis replied:
Well that is a challenging point, and I've had to ponder it. But is the example really any different from Jesus' call for people to "Repent!"? Or is it any different from the very fact of a Judgment Day, when Jesus will say, "I was hungry and you didn't feed me"? Here he says, Messiah himself lived in your midst, preached the Kingdom, and you didn't repent. He uses the example of Sodom to shame them and so to stir their consciences.
I think that there is a difference between Matthew 11:23 (actually, the entire passage of Matthew 11:20-24) and two examples given by Professor Innis. Neither example offers a counterfactual. In the first example, Christ's call to "Repent!" is a present offer, current at each moment (until retracted someday). In the second example, the judgement pronounced by Christ on Judgement Day is for a past failure, therefore closed off in the past (and thus judged). Neither of these situations is expressed counterfactually. Although I believe that the call and the judgement both presuppose personal responsibility and thereby free choice, I think that Matthew 11:23 provides a stronger argument by virtue of its counterfactual.

Basic to my argument here is the statement that a "should" entails a "could." According to my friend Bill Vallicella, The Maverick Philosopher, this is equivalent to stating that an "ought" implies a "can." The standard view in philosophy is: "If one ought to do X, then one must be able to do X." I think that this statement is even more clear when expressed as a past subjunctive -- "If one should have done X, then one must have been able to do X" -- for this means that one could have acted differently.

Christ's words in Matthew 11:23 seem to mean that in the very conditions in which Capernaum had found itself at the time of the call to repent, it could have chosen to repent or not to repent. Capernaum did not repent, but this fact does not mean that it could not have repented, for if that were the case, the analogy to Sodom as a counterfactually repentent city would fail.

My argument depends upon Christ referring to a past event, which is how I understand Matthew 11:20:
Τότε ἤρξατο ὀνειδίζειν τὰς πόλεις ἐν αἷς ἐγένοντο αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὖ μετενόησαν (Morphological Greek New Testament)

Then began he to reproach the cities in which were done most of his mighty works, because they did not repent. (Young's Literal Translation, slightly edited)
The Greek word metenoasan (μετενόησαν) is in the aorist, and ou metenoasan (οὖ μετενόησαν) therefore means "did not repent." Some translations use the past perfect: "had not repented." Either way, I take Christ's words here as referring to a past event from the perspective of Christ himself.

But I suppose that there might be some disagreement on how to understand the use of the aorist in this verse, and I'll have to think about this point.

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1 Comments:

At 7:18 AM, Blogger Dominic Bnonn Tennant said...

Hi Jeffery. A couple of thoughts:

The standard view in philosophy is: "If one ought to do X, then one must be able to do X."

I think it's incumbent on us as Christians to recognize that "standard views" in philosophy don't necessarily reflect reality or Scripture. Not that we should ignore philosophy—but the wisdom of the world, uninformed by God's word, is tantamount to foolishness, and so we certainly shouldn't appeal to it as an authority in and of itself.

Here, saying that a necessary condition for moral obligation is the ability to do what is obliged (call this principle O) seems to lead to conclusions which are...shall we say "hard to accept":

Say a man embezzles a million dollars, and is subsequently caught. At trial, because of mitigating circumstances, the judge agrees to defer jailtime if the man simply pays back the money. Unfortunately, most of it has already been squandered. Surely we'd agree that the man ought to pay back the money (in fact, even if he were not so ordered, he still ought to pay it back)—yet certainly he cannot pay it back. The imperative does not imply an indicative. Yet, if O holds, then:

1. If the man ought to pay back the money, then he must be able to pay back the money.
2. The man is not able pay back the money.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that the man ought to pay back the money [modus tollens].

So, under principle O, we are led to the very counterintuitive view that the man is under no moral obligation to pay back the money he stole.

There are, of course, a lot of biblical counterexamples as well. Pharaoh in Exodus 9–11 was inexorably caused by God to have his heart hardened, and could not have chosen otherwise than to refuse Moses, because of God's determination of what would occur. Yet he still ought to have let Israel go when commanded, as evidenced by the fact that he was said to have sinned by refusing. The Jews in Acts 2:23 are said to have delivered Jesus up to be killed "according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God". The events of the crucifixion were definite because God's plan was definite. They could not have occurred otherwise, since then they—and, commensurately, God's plan—would have been indefinite. Yet the Jews still ought not to have crucified the Christ, as I'm sure you will agree. Assyria, in Isaiah 10, is called the rod of God's anger, sent against Israel so definitely that it's as if its king were commanded—he could not have done otherwise. Yet he ought not to have gone against Israel: "when the Lord has finished all his work on Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, he will punish the speech of the arrogant heart of the king of Assyria and the boastful look in his eyes" (v 12). These sorts of examples can be multiplied quite significantly. It's very hard to see, in Scripture, the principle of that "ought" implies "can". Frankly, the opposite seems obviously to be true.

Christ's words in Matthew 11:23 seem to mean that in the very conditions in which Capernaum had found itself at the time of the call to repent, it could have chosen to repent or not to repent. Capernaum did not repent, but this fact does not mean that it could not have repented, for if that were the case, the analogy to Sodom as a counterfactually repentent city would fail.

I think clarification is needed here. It's possible to draw certain distinctions in what it means that Capernaum "could have chosen". If you mean that, at the time of their choosing, it was within their natural capacity to choose rightfully instead of wrongfully (ie, there is a possible world in which Capernaum chose rightfully), then I would agree. But that possible world is not the actual world, and the actual world is determined by God's decree. So if you mean that, at the time of their choosing, it was indeterminate as to whether they would choose rightfully or wrongfully, such that their choosing rightfully was an actual possibility which could have obtained, then I must disagree. That would entail indeterminism in God's decree, or ignorance on God's part as regards the future, or something of that kind. That is not a biblically tenable view (I don't regard open theism as a valid Christian position—it is simply a heresy, and I think a damnable one).

Regards,
Bnonn

 

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